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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To the student of economics, the aspects of labor
should be very important.

Labor plays a very important

role in our economy and should be studied with great care
and in detail.

In studying labor we will encounter the

"labor problem" which is so prevalent in our present day.
You can hardly pick up the newspaper or read magazines without encountering some aspects of the "labor
problem."

If one continues to follow the labor news he

will discover not one, but many labor problems.

A bus

union may strike, tying up transportation to a major
degree; unemployment may plague one city while another
suffers from a labor shortage; an employee may believe
that profit sharing may solve the labor problem; an explosion traps 10 coal miners; a statistician reports
that wages are rising, and all of these could be extended
before they would cover all the types of labor problems.
In common with other areas of the social sciences,
labor problems face the difficulty that they cannot be
analysed under laboratory conditions.

In

consequence it

is difficult to trace or prove cause-and-effect relation1
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ships, and most generalizations within the field reflect
the opinions of careful observers rather than scientific
laws.

This does not mean that inductive studies are

lacking.

Many excellent ones have been made that utilize

controlled sampling and statistical techniques of evaluation, but they deal largely with the details upon which
informed opinions must be based, rather than with broad
conclusions of general interest.
At this point, the wri t er wishes to say that in
pursuing his problem he will use informed opinions rather
than broad conclusions of the general interest.

These

opinions will be the opinions of the experts.
Statement Of The Problem
The problem of this paper lies within the effects
of large controlled, coordinated and influential labor
groups upon our economy.

These large labor groups re-

ferred to may be called "unions".

This paper is restricted

to one large labor group which is said to be one of the
largest in the world.
the AFL-CIO.

The labor group referred to is

The AFL and the CIO merged in 1955 and have

caused much controversy as to what effects will result.
The problem of this paper 1s to determine what are
the actual economic effects of the AFL-CIO merger.

An

3

attempt will be made to list various predicted effects
of the merger and analyze each to determine its actual
va lidity.

These will be compa red to the actual effects

of the merger up to the present, and a brief look into
the future will be discussed.
It is felt that before one can really understand
a nd grasp the contents o f this investig ative paper, a
brief look into the hi storical background of unions is
needed.

To facilitate this, a brief look at early unions

will be taken.
Early Unionism
The history of trade-unionism in the United States
is frequently dated from 1792, when a local union was
f ormed by the journeymen cordwainers (shoemakers) of
Philadelphia.

There were others such as the carpenters,

pr inters, bakers, and tailors which f ormed organizations
of their crafts.
These early unions were composed of skilled or
str a tegically located workers.

In fact throughout his-

tory, this g roup has always been the first to organize.
11

Those who by reason of skill or strategic location can exert pressure or inflict
a loss by withdrawing their services, have the
ability to secure employer recognition long 1
before t heir less favorably located workers."
1

G. F. Bloom and~H. R. Northrap, Economics of Labor

and Industrial Relations (Philadelphia : The Blakiston
Co., 1950), p . 22.
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These early unions did not engage in collective
bargaining as we are familiar with it today.

The unions

would post its prices and announce the wages and working
conditions for which its members would work.

If the em-

ployer refused to meet the union's wishes, a strike would
ensue, and necessitate a compromise being worked out.
The custom of joint employer-employee conferences developed slowly.
After the development of city fe_derations of local
unions came the national unions. "The first national
union which has had a continous existence up to the present time is the International Typographical Union,
2

founded in 1850. 11

After the national unions we had a

federation of national unions.

The first federation of

national unions which had a continous existence up to
the present time is the American Federation of Labor,
founded in 1886.
There have been other forms of organizations tried
during the history of unionism.

There have been attempts

to combine people from different trades and industries
into a single local union, and to combine "mixed locals"
int.G-all-inclusive national organization.

An example of

2

Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Lab r
Relations (New Jersey: ,_Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, p. 92.

1
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this type of action was demostrated by the Knights of
labor which will be discussed later.
attempts to merge federations also.

There have been
This was finally

done in December of 1955 when the AFL and CIO merged.
In discussing early unions we will find obstacles
that influenced the decline of union growth at various
times.

There were doctrines originated to check union

power and fight it.

No other doctrines have gained

more popularity and demostrated attempts to check or
destroy unions than the "Conspiracy Doctrine" and the
"Restraint of Trade Doctrine".

These two doctrines

had a definite adverse effect on unions during their
existence.
The Conspiracy Doctrine
The basic theory of the nconspiracy Doctrine" is
that a lawful act when done by an individual may be unlawful when it is the result of a concerted agreement.
For example, it has been held that it was legal for an
individual worker to ask for an increase in wages.

When

individuals combine, however, for the purpose of demanding a wage increase, courts during the early history of
trade unions often ruled that the combination of workers
was in itself a violation of the law.

In general, ac-

cording to common lawL..courts tend to hold that a com-

6

b1nat1on of individuals is legal if the purpose is the
benefit of the members of the group.

But if the pur-

pos e is the injury of the employer, the organization
was illegal.

Where the organization undertakes to ac-

complish a purpose tha t is legal by employing all illegal means, any act of the organization itself is declared illegal and individual members become liable for
the actions of the group.

In a given case the question

t o be settled is whether the act of a labor .)rganizat i on is for the purpose of gaining a benefit for the
workers or of injuring the employer.

And since a union

may feel that it can gain its point only by inflicting
fi nancui.l loss on an employer, the court must decide
whe the r the loss to the employer or the benefit to be
gained by the workers is of the greater importance.
The Restraint of Trade Doctrine
According to the "Restraint of Trade Doctrine",
a ny contract that restrains trade is against public
policy and is unenforceable.

Moreover, when persons

combine to effect an agreement that will restrain trade,
the combina tion may be regarded as a criminal conspiracy.

At common law a combination for the purpose

of peacefully persuading an employer to grant an increase in wages was usually allowed to be legal.

But
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if the purpose was to coerce him, by using "unreasonable" means, such as a strike, picketing, or a boycott,
the combination was held to be a conspiracy in restraint
of trade.

What was the reasonable in any case, of course,

depended upon the judgement of the court.
These two common-law principles or doctrines played
a major role in judicial decisions effecting labor.

In

a number of cases brought againist trade-unions during
the nineteenth century, any sort of union activity was
held to be a criminal conspiracy punishable by fine or
imprisonment.

· he legality of trade-unionism remained

in considerable doubt until the case of Commonwealth
verses Hunt, decided in 1842.

In this case it was ruled

that union activities were not unlawful per se, their
legality depended rather on the objectives which they
were designed to attain.

From this time onward, the

doctrine that any union is a criminal conspiracy fell
increasingly out of favor.

The thinking of judges was

no doubt influenced by the fact that unions continued

to grow despite judicial disapproval.

CHAPTER II
THE RISE OF NATIONAL UNIONS
The beginnings of local unionism around t he year
1800 have been discussed.

These locals soon found that

they were relatively weak when compared to a strong
employer.

Consisting of workers in only one trade, with

l i mited funds and no outside support, they often crumbled
whe n forced to strike against a large employer or employer association.

'J:he need for some kind of defensive

alliance with other unions was felt almost from the
beginning.
There are two ways that such an alliance can be
forme d.

The local may join with local unions of other

trades in t he same area to form city-wide or state-wide
organization; or it may join with other local unions in
the same trade or industry to form national trai e-unions.
The first efforts were in the former direction. "Citywide federations, called at the time "trade assemblies"
sprang up in Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore in
1833, and in ten other cities during t he next two years."
1

Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor
Re l a tions (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 64.
8

l
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The main function of these groups was to give mutual
aid in strikes. Their funds were obtained by taxing each
local so many cents per member per month, and the tax
was sometimes increased to meet emergency situations.

A

local wishing to go on strike usually had to secure approval from either the majority or by two thirds of the
members of the locals.

They had to do this to be able

to draw strike benefits from the common fund.

The trade

a ssemblies also functioned as boycott organizations,
l obbyists, propaganda bureaus, publishers of labor newspapers; and in some cities sponsored an independent
labor party.

The usefulness of city federations is proved

by the fact that they have persisted, with some change
of function, to the present day.
It may be asked why was it necessary for the local
unions to go beyond this and establish national unions
of t heir respective trades and industries?

One reason

i s said to have been the nationalization of the market
for many goods.

It has also been said that union organi-

za tion tend to parellel the organization of industry.
I n an industry in which employers compete on a national
basis, the isolated local soon finds itself competing
with local unions in other plants of the industry.

In

t his sort of competit1~n, wages tend t o level down to

10
the lowest rates prevailing anywhere in the country.
National unions date for all practical purposes
from the Civil War.

·rwo so-called national unions of

shoemakers and printers were formed in 1835-36, but
they were confined to the Alantic coast and were wiped
out almost immediately by depression.

Three permanent

organizations appeared during the fifties; the printers
(1850), molders (1859), and machinists and blacksmiths
(1859).

The first period of intensive national organi-

zation, however, was from 1863 to 1873.

During these

years some twenty-six new national unions were formed,
many of which have survived to the present day.

11

The

present unions of locmotive engineers, locomotive firemen, carpenters, cigar makers, bricklayers, and painters
2

date from this period."
The national unions showed much more resistance to
depression than the earlier local unions.

The depres-

sion of 1873-80 caused a great decline in union membership, but at least eleven national unions are known to
have survived these years and ei ?;ht new national unions
were formed during the depression.
The national unions not only survived, but gradually
took over more and more functions from the local and the

11

city federations. They began to build up war chests to
aid in financing strikes.

To prevent dissipation of

these funds, it was necessary to f ·orbid local unions to
call strikes without the approval of the national union.
The national officers thus became involved in all important disputes between local unions and employers, with
a view of preventing strikes except where absolutely
necessary.

From this it was natural for national officers

to begin participating in the negotiating of new contracts with employers.

This action was desirable also

in order to keep some reasonable relation among the
schedules and other contract terms secured by the various locals.
It was natural also for the national officers with
an intimate knowledge of the trade or industry to take
over the work of organizing new locals.

The great ma-

jority of full-time union organizers now draw their pay
from the treasuries of the national unions.

The benefit

functions of the unions also became centralized in the
national office.

Union rules for sickness benefits,

death benefits, strike benefits, and other types of payments were established throughout the union, and funds
were paid to the national treasurer and were disbursed
by him.

12

The expanding functions of the national unions
t ended to transfer the loyalty of local unions from the
city federation to the national union of their trade.
Most workers naturally have a sense of closer kinship
with other members in their own trade or industry.

This

fee ling was reinforced by the benefits received from the
national organizations.

Dues paid to the national unions

and cash benefits received from it soon amounted to many
times the amounts paid to the city federations.
The cornerstone

of the trade-union today are the

great national unions.

The largest unions, all with

members hip in excess of one hundred t hrousand, had a
total members hip in 1952 of about twelve mil l ion, or
about t hree-qua rters of all organized workers.

These

unions are of greater significance than the federations
base d upon them.
Federation of these national unions da tes from the
1880 's.

Several attempts at federation of national unions

were made in earlier years.

There was t he National Labor

Union, which flourished during the post-Civil War depression of 1866-1870.

Its conventions were composed mainly

of delegates from lo cal unions, city federations, and
l abor political clubs.

In such a he terogeneous gro up,

disc ussions centered an political action.

The movement
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attained some local sucesses, but collapsed in 1872
after a national convention nomina ted Judge Davis for
the presidency.

Judge Davis declined too late for a

new nomina tion to be made, and this led to the death
of the already weak organization.
There have been three important federations devoting themselves to trade-union objectives.

These three

impor tant federations are the Knights of Labor, the
Amer ican Federation of Labor, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
The Knights of Labor
Organized in 1869 as a secret society by Uriah
Stephens, a Philadelphia garment cutter, the Knights of
Labor grew slowly at first.

Considerable uneasiness was

caused when t he appearance in public places of strange
symbols, including five stars standing for the union's
name , would bring hundreds of workmen together.

Al-

though intended to protect the men against employer
persecution, the mystery exposed the organization to misrepresentation and did more harm t han good, so that in
1878 the element of secrecy was dropped.

Thereafter

membership grew rapidly, reaching 100,000 in 1885.
Finally the union forced that shewd financier, Jay Gould,
to treat with it in orQer to avert strikes on the Wasbash
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and the ~:issouri Pacific railroads.

The effect of the

victory was electrifying: "membership skyrocketed to
730,000 by the following year, making the Knights the
most imposing labor union ;n the country had ever known. 11
The ideals of the Knights were very high.
"They looked forward to the end of the
i-rage system, but they were not socialists;
rather they hoped t o establish a new social
order by means of co-operation and political
action for the benefit of the workers. Th~y
wished to secure for the workers the full
enjoyment of the wealth they create, sufficient leisure in which to develop their intellectual, moral, and social faculties, all
the benefits, recreation, and pleasure of
association. To obtain these they demanded,
among other things, the es t ablishment of
bureaus of labor statistics, reservation of
public lands for actual settlers, the repeal
of unequal laws, a we el<:ly payday, mechanic's
lien laws, abolition of the contract system
of labor on public works, substitution of
arbitration for strikes, prohibition of the
employment of children under fourteen years
of age, the eight-hour day, etc.; but the
c8rdinal principles remained always unioij,
education, and producers' co-operation."
The Knights sought to realize the ideal of one big
union and aimed to bring into organization all productive labor using the strenght of the skilled, and mobi3

s. Perlman, A Histor of Tra e Unionism in the
United States (New York: MacNillan Co., 1952 , p. 273.
4

E. L. Bogart and D. L. Kemrnever, Economic History
of the American People iNew York: Longman, Jreen and
Co., 1953), p. 517.

3
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lizing the unskilled so that their competition would not
hurt the skilled.

Most of the authority rested at the

top of the organization.

The lowest unit was the local

assembly, usually made up of about a dozen workers of
one trade.

Next came the District Assembly in which

numerous trades were represented and which had complete
aut~ority over its locals.

Above it was the General As-

sembly, the highest tribunal, and when it was not in
session its power rested in the hands of the General
Executive Board headed by a Grand Master Workman.

By

1886 the Knights were losing their importance in the
labor world .

The reasons for this rapid decline after

1886 may be summed up under four heads.
(1) Despite their early abhorrence of strikes they
engaged in a number of large ones for which they were
unprepared ••
eyes .

rhis of course hurt them in the workers'

The ease with which they called one sympathetic

s t rike after another with little regard to the strategic
importance of the groups selected did more harm than
good.
(2) The Knights uncompromising a ttitude and sometime
violent methods lost them public support.

The sabotage

connected with the Southwestern railroad strike in 1886

16
made an impression on the public mind second only to
that of the destructive railroad strike of 1887, and this
was merely the most outstanding of many Knight strikes
at that time .

On top came the bomb throwing episode in

Haymarket Square, Chicago, during a renewed eight-hour
movement .

Although it was not known who had done this,

eight anarchists were arrested for inciting the outrage,
and when one proved to be a Knight and his local assembly
would not expel him, many people condemned the whole
order.
(J) Many failures occured in the co-operative

enterprises of the Order .

Some 200 co-operative ven-

tures were undertaken, chiefly in cooperage, shoemaking,
and mining, the best known being the coal mine at
Cannelburg, Indiana.

The average investment was

10,000

and the losses were heavy.
(4) Most important was the breakdo~m of the feeling
of solidarity among the different types of members.

The

mixed assemblies possessed little in common, and the
vague ideals of brotherhood were not powerful enough to
bind the workers from diverse industries into a unified
body for action.

In fact, between the skilled and un-

skilled there developed at times a positive animosity

17
because the skilled workers realized that they were
strategically more important in winning a strike than
the replaceable unskilled workers and consequently
resented sharing the gains if the strike was a success
or were bitter if the strike failed.

Add to this the

success of the compact craft unions outside the Order in
winning their strikes, and it becomes apparent why after
1886 the skilled workers in both industrial and craft
unions drifted more and more into the new American
Federation of Labor.
The American Federation of labor
While the Knights of Labor was achieving its great
boom, a group of trade union leaders met in 1881 and
formed wha t was first called the Federat ion of Organized
Trades and Labor Unions and then, after 1886, the American Federation of Labor.

About twenty-five trades were

represented at this time, including carpenters and joiners,
cigar makers, furniture makers, iron molders, miners and
mine laborers, and typesetters .
rapidly.

The Federation grew

Vuch of the Federa ti on's success must be at-

tributed to the lea dership of Samuel Gompers , an Englishborn immigrant of Dutch-Jewish descent and a cigar maker
by trade , who was president from 1886 to his death in
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1924, with the exception of one year.

Ad olph Strasser

o f the Cigar Makers' Union was also an important figure
i n the AF of L.
The chief purposes of the Federation were to unite
t he various unions for mutual assistance, to obtain
legislation favorable to the interests of the working
c lasses, to use every possible means to remedy abuses
fr om which workers suffered, and to i mprove their working conditions.

In carrying out this program the Fede-

r at ion mainta ined that the strike, the boycott, and the
unfair list were justifiable and necessary methods in
achieving its ends.
The philosophy of the AFL leaders was a pragmatic
one , grounded in the principles of American capitalism.
They were out to improve the conditions of t hose whom
they represented and t hey represented the skilled workers
who , because of their strategic location, had the bargaining power sufficient to command employer recognition.
It consistently attempted to raise the standards of
livi ng by shorter working hours, higher wages, and better
worki ng conditions.

Gompers prided himself on being a

r e alist, disapproved of political entanglements, avoided
t he sympa the t ic strike, and was generally conserva tive.
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He believed that the betterment of labor's conditions
by short stages, as opportunities arose, would be more
lasting.
The organization of the Federation differed markedly
from that of the Knights.

The lowest un it was the local

union, whose members were all of one trade, say cigar
making ; then all the cigar-making locals were organized
into one national union, and finally the American Federation of Labor united all nationals.

The system was

mode led after our own government, with each national
union playing the part of a state.

It is true that there

were central and state organizations, but they were of
secondary importance and often temporary.

The Federation

was thus merely a loose grouping of practically selfgoverning national or local unions, which were largely
independent of one another.

The members of one local

affiliated union might strike and t hose of another might
continue to work in the same plant.

Only matters of

general interest came before the Federation's officers.
Aut hority was highly decentralized and the Federation
was held together largely by the recognition of each
union' s independence plus the assurance that the Federation would admit no rival union of the same trade.

20

At first the unions making up the American Federation of Labor contained the skilled members of a particular craft or tra1e, and largely neglected the unskilled.

But as the machine methods destroyed the value

of special skill or the need of training for a particular
craft, and as industrial combinations brought together
under one management various branches of an industry,
t he power and importance of the older type of self-sufficient or seperate trade union was threatened.

Some

of the unions within the AFL, while not yet approving
the idea of one big union sought to organize all workers
in their industries; such were the coal miners, the
brewery workers, and others.
Samuel Jompers held on to his post until he died.
" He was replaced by William 3reen a na tive of a mining
community in Ohio."

5

Green held the office of the pre-

sident until and after the gro ~p of industrial minded
workers split from the AFL and formed the CIO.
Congress Of Industrial Organization
The C.I.O. came into being when the majority of the
A. ? . of L. delegates at the annual convention in Alantic

5
G. F. Bloom and H. R. Northrup, Economics of Labor

and Indus t rial Relations (Philadelphia: The Blakiston
Co., 1950), p. 40.
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City in 1935 voted against the organization of workers
along industrial lines in massproduction industries.
A l a rge minority revolted and founded the C.I.O on
November 10, 1935, with eight of the unions and one million members.

"The argument for industrial unionism was

led by Lewis of the Mine Workers, supported by Hilman of
the Clothing workers, Dubinsky of the Ladies' Garment
6

Workers, and Howard of the Typographical Union. 11

John

L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers, the largest
constituent union, became president.
unions were from the textile trade.

Most of the other
The C.I.O. had the

same kind of federal framework as the A.F. of L., the
chief structural difference was the organization of local
unions by industry instead of by craft.

Partisans of

industrial and craft methods of organization hurled arguments at American labor and the public for many months.
The A.F. of L. leaders said that the C.I.O. leaders were
guilty of dual unionism, a high form of labor treason
because it means divided forces where there should be
a unified front before the employer.

The

c.r.o.

leaders

replied that the reactionary element in the A. F. of L.
was itself guilty for prohibiting industrial unionism
Lloyd G. Reynolds,__Labor Economics and Labor
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 86.

22

and would rather wreck organized l a bor t han lose control.
Cr af t organization was archaic in a f a ctory economy,
t hey insisted, and was t he reason why only one-tenth of
t he working population was enrolled in unions after two
gener at ions of the A. F~ of L.

With in another t wo years

t he C~I.O. had partially organized the automobile, stee ~,
oil , and r ubber in~ustries and boasted J2 national unions
and J ,7 00,000 members.
The met hods and conduct of the unions in this new
giant . organization sometimes showed more spirit and ingenuity than respect for the law.

Rejoicing in their

new-found strength, the unskilled workers and semiskille d workers were anxious to ma ke up for lost time.
The head office had difficulty controlling t he national
union le aders and these in turn were sometimes unable to
restrai n the enthuasiasm of their members h ip.

Public

opinion , a lthough sympathetic toward the workers, was
r epeatedly shocked by the new union's excesses.

A

brief look into the General Motors strike of 1937 will
serve as an illustration.
The Detroit sit-down strike.

Most of the workers

in the automobile industry were barely semi-skilled,
since four out of every five jobs could be learned
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within two weeks.

But life on the assembly line was

dull and very wearing.

Some were unable to stand the

pace and complained that it was constantly being speeded
up.

Numerous labor spies made organization hazardous,

and company policy based on the strategy of

11

divide and

rule 11 encouraged dissention among the unions that did
exist.

After the "New Deal" began, the United Automobile

Workers, which was at first an A.F. of L. industrial
union, grew in power, then deserted.

The

c.r.o.,

put on

a vigorous organizing campaign under the leadership of
Homer Martin, and in December, 1936, endeavored tonegotiate with company officials for recognition and
certain concessions.

When the officials refused tone-

gotiate, a strike began at a Fisher Body plant and spread.
The workers just sit down in the factories and refused
to move; their attitude being that they were protecting
their jobs.

The corporation stressed that the men were

trespassing, often destroying property, and preventing
the operation of valuable equipment whose enforced idleness was very costly.

A court ordered the men to vacate,

but was not enforced largely owing to Govenor Murphy of
Michigan, who feared there would be bloodshed.

Instead

he tried to secure a settlement and at last succeeded.
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The strike was won; the union achieved recognition, a
survey of speed-up abuses was agreed to, time and onehalf for overtime was to prevail, and there was to be no
discrimination against unionists.
The sit-down strike was novel and highly effective
at a time when the union needed victories to give the
membership self-confidence.

It was declared illegal in

the Fansteel case of 1938, but the C.I.O~ strikes continued to exist.
Not all members of unions belong to either the A.F.
of L. or the C.I.O.

Since 1914 approximately one unionist

in five to one in ten has not.

Most famous of the in-

dependent unions are the Big Four Railway Brotherhoods;
the engineers, firemen, conductors, and trainmen.

Other

railway workers have independent unions, as do also a
few groups in manufacturing and a considerable number
of workers in the government service, particularly in
the post-office department.

Finally, between 1942, when

John L. Lewis led his United Mine Workers out of the

c.r.o.,

and 1946 when he led them back to the A.F. of L.,

that great union of 400,000 members was an independent
organization.

-

CHAPrER III
THE AFL-CIO MERGER
Factors Leading to The Merger
One of the most important events in American h istory
took place in New York City's vast 71st Regiment Armory
on t he morning of Monday, December 5, 1955.

It was

then that the United American Federation of Labor and
Congr e ss of Industrial Organizations was brought into
being .
On several occasions, negotiating committees of high
AFL and CIO officials were appointed with the objective
of working out terms for a merger of the two unions.
Al l of these negotiation attempts had resulted in failure
unti l 1955.

"One major obstacle was the extensive over1
lapp ing of jurisdictions between AFL and CIO unions."

There was the realization that unification required cons iderable merging of various national unions and sizeable transfers of membership from one union to another.
Labor leaders of the various unions were uneasy as to
just how they and their organizations would come out
l

Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 92.
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in such a reorganization.
One of the most important steps toward union unity
between the AFL and CIO came in 1952, when President
Philip Murray of the CIO and William Green of the AFL
died within a few months of each other.

George Meany

and Walter Ruether were elected presidents of the AFL
and CIO respectively and quickly began discussions looking toward a possible merger of the two groups.

They

were not successful at first but they did formulate a
"no-raiding agreement" in 1953.
The merger has aroused a great deal of curiosity
as to why it occured when it did, after the committees
on unity which had been meeting off and on over many
ye~rs had previously been unsuccessful in agreeing even
on the first steps toward uniting.

It also aroused

fears in the minds of some, particularly in the ranks
of management, that the new giant organization would
emerge as a labor monopoly, and would perhaps prove to
be the nucleus for the labor party.
There was actually no single reason leadir..g to the
merger but rather a complex of reasons which, taken
together, made such a move not only feasible in 1955,
where previously it had pro_:yed impossible, but in im-
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portant respects, imperative.

First, let us look at

some of the obstacles which made unity impossible at
first but which by 1955 had been removed.
In its initial formation, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (originally the Committee for Industrial
Organization) had split off from the parent AFL on the
issue of how the unorganized workers should be brought
into the labor movement.

This issue was important in

view of the support which the New Deal government had
given to unionization in the National Relations Act,
after the Senator from New York who fathered it.

This

act gave enforceable rights to workers to form unions,
unmolested by employer opposition.
The protection afforded by the act provided the
unions with an unparalleled opportunity to expand their
memberships.

At the time the act was passed the total

number of unionized workers was no more than 4 million,
including those in independent unions.
potential was great.

The organizing

In the vast mass-production in-

dustries, where unionism barely had a toe hold, the
question arose, how should the AFL set about bringing
workers into unions?

-

The AFL was controlled, at the t op, by the president
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of the powerful craft unions in the building and metal
t rade s.

These officials insisted that wo r k ers pos-

sess i ng skills and training which had be e n traditionally
r epre sented by t heir unions should be enrolled in their
unions, regardless of the industry in which they were
work ing.

This was knoi,m as the craft doctrine.

There was a significant opposition to this policy
wit hin the AFL.

Other powerful leaders of n a tional

unions, alt hough out numbered by the craft leaders, advocate d the formation of unions on an ind ustry basis,
without regard to craft.

The t h inking behind th is ap-

proach was t hat modern technology had made craft jurisdicti ons obsolete.

It was the belief of t hese industry-

oriente d l a bor leaders that a craft a pproa ch would mean
that t he l a bor movement would forever remain a small
body of t he aristocracy of skilled workers, having no
intere st in and holding out no promise to t h e larger
segment of American workmen who failed to meet or fit
within the trad itional craft definitions.
Finally, finding no support in AFL p olicy, the
small group of union leaders who held t o the indus t rialunion philosophy, with John L. Lewis of t he United Nine
Worke rs as their spokesman, set up a committee to promote
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industrial organization.

Their action was held a

violation of the AFL federation policy and they were
finally dismissed from the AFL when they refused to
stop this sort of action.

Thus the CIO was born.

After t his both federations set about organizing
efforts.

In the production industry it became evident

that the industrial philosphy was more appropriate than
the craft philosophy.

The United Auto Workers, the

United Rubber Workers, the United Steel Workers, and
United

lectrical Workers grew large in a short period

of time.
The AFL finding themselves in contests with the
new CIO over the enrolling of new members, was driven
to make room for the workers without skills, in whom
they had previously little interest.

Craft became a

nucleus for organizing, but ceased to serve as the only
basis for organization.

Thus there began to grow with

in the AFL an industry-mindedness different from that
of the CIO only in degree.
The effect of this development was to eliminate
the craft-verses-industry issue as a basis for division.

This issue still remains alive, though not as

vigorous as it once was, within the merged federation;
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but it ceased to be an issue distinguishing one federation from the other .

At the time of t he merger, the

AFL brought more industrial unions to the ne w organizat ion than did the CIO.

'l'hus one deterrent t o the

merger had be en eliminated by 1955.
A second barrier which fell by the wayside by 1955
was the stereotypes which each of the two labor groups
had built up of the other over the years.

'l 'o the AFL,

t he CI O unions were for a long time regarded as <;ommuni st infiltrated.

'l'o the ClO, the Alt'L unions were

r egarded as racketridden.

'l'hese charges were in some

measure true.
'l'he new c..:io was in need of organizers
and the Communists offered to supply them.
Against the warning advice of vavid Dubinsky,
Lewis accepted their assistance and thousands
of UlO iobs were filled via the Communist
Party."
'

1

The CIO in 1949 a nd 1950 set about to clean its
house of Communists by expelling eleven unions which
were found to be Communist-dominated.
11

When the International Longshoreman's
association refused to clean out its racketeering practices following the widespread
publicity given them by New York officials,
the ILA was expelled from the AFL. 11 3
2

G.F. Bloom and H.R. Northrup, Economics of Labor
and Industrial Relations (Philadelphia: The Blakiston
Co., 1950), p. 49.

3

Alfred Kuhn, Labor Institutions and Economics
(New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 77.
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Thus each federation took decisive actions which
helped to dispel the stereotypes which each had built
of the other.
There was a need for more than the removal of the
previous deterrents to unify to bring about the merger.
There was a need for some positive incentives.
In 1952, when William Green president of the AFL,
died and George Meany took over the job, there 11as some
stirring a mong other union officials who help personal
aspi r ations.

About this same time Philip Murray died

and Walter Ruether took over the CIO.
"Within the AFL Meany faced a problem
posed by Dave Beck, president of the Teamsters, who gave evidence of intending to
set off on a giganic organizing campaing
that would seem almost certain to bring him
into conflict with other unions within the
federation . The Teamsters, largest organization in the AFL, was also one of the most
strategic. Its cooperation was frequently
sought by other unionists. Its willingness
to respect picket lines was at times essential to the effectiveness of strikes
called by other unions. With members in
more than fifty major industry groups, its
ambitions posed a threat to the security and
independence of other unions. Beck as
president had been consorting with David
McDonald, president of the Steel-Workers,
and Lewis, president of the Miners; and
rumors had sprung up that they were plotting a third federation. If the Teamsters
were to pull out of the AFL and start an
opposition labor group, there would be
trouble for the AFL and its new president.
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If they stayed, there could still be trouble.
Reuther in the CIO faced at least equal
difficulty. The same McDonald who had been
holding conversations with Beck and Lewis had
intimated from time to time that he and his
Ste elworkers might disaffiliate from the CIO.
His personal rivalry with Reuther was well
known. It could be expected that he would
have enjoyed Reuther's discomfiture at being
left head of a CIO that at one stroke had
lost almost one-fourth of its membership.
I•1oreover, there was some possi bill ty that
NcDonald might have taken other CIO unions
along with him. Reuther, himself justfiably
ambitious, would have been left in charge of
a shadow of the former CIO, his prestige
perhaps irretrievably damaged.
With each federa uion president thus
faced with internal problems, it seems natural that the thoughts of each should turn
more on merger . With a pooling of the
strength of both groups, the merged organization could better withstand whatever divisive action might be taken by the Teamsters or the Steelworkers. In unity there
lay strength. Moreover, the personalities
of the two federations presidents favored the
effort. Each was idealistic in his aims,
dedicated to the labor movement and labor's
welfare, whatever other ambitions each might
harbor for himself; each recognized that the
future held grave problems for the survival
and expansion of unionism, which could be
more effectively met by joint action rather
than by seperate and sometiijes conflicting
stands. Unity made sense. 11
There was the contention that if t he top leaders
were removed from the scene and if negotiations for the
merger could be left to the rank and file, unity would
4

N. W. Chamberlain, Labor (New York :
Book Co., 1958), pp. 57-58.-.

f11cGraw-Hill
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come quickly.

The reasoning behind this was that a

strong sympathy for a single movement which would sweep
aside the forces obstructing the merger.
verse proved to be true.

But the re-

Although in many communities

and cities cooperation between the two groups had been
going on for years.
"There appears to have been relatively
little rank-and-file sentiment be h ind the
merger, and although in some communities cooperation between the two groups had been
going on for y.ears, in most cities and states
the problem of effecting a unity in the field
posed problems which many local leaders found
distastedful. The real pres s ure for merger
came from the top."5
These were the major factors leading to the merger
which took place at the merger convention.
The Merger Convention
On Monday, December 5, 1955, at 9:30 o'clock the
fir st constitutional convention of the AFL-CIO was
called to order jointly by President George Meany of
the Ame rican Federation of Labor and Walter Reuther
of the Congress of Industrial Organizat ions .

This con-

vention took place in New York City's vast ?1st Regiment Armory.
Walter Reuther acted as temporary chairman and
declare d the convention in order for business.
5

.Il219.., p. 58.

The

34
National Anthems of the United States and Canada were
sung a nd all remained standing while the invocation
was de livered.
The delegates and guests took their seats and tempora r y Chairman Reuther introduced four outstanding
New Yorkers.

Each of the New Yorkers warmly welcomed

t he convention.
Mayor Robert F. Wagner, s on of the late Senator
Wagner , a ddressed the convention also.

He extended his

best wis he s for the success of the union for the betterment of America and the world.
After Mayor Wagner completed his speech, Temporary
Chairman Reuther asked all members of the Joint Unity
Committ ee to rise.

He hailed them as the people who

had t'iO r ked hard in bringing the AFL-CIO where it was
today a nd had really been the a rchitects of this beginning o f a united labor movement.

Then with appropria te

r emarks , Mr. Reuther yielded the gavel to Harry C. Jates,
a vete r a n of American trade unionism.

Mr. Gates gave

a short speech and then introduced Wal t er Reuther for
h i s forma l a ddres s to the convention.
Mr. Reuther's address was one mostly dedicated to
t he unity of the two organizations.

He stated clearly
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just how his organization would contribute faithfully
to this new organization.

This points can be seen in

hisspeech when he said:
All of us are truly blessed in having
the great human experience of sharing in the
shaping of the decisions of this historic
convention. In truth we stand on the threshold of the beginning of what I know will
be the most glorious chapter in the history
of the American labor movement.
I say to George Meany and our many
friends who make up the leadership of the
former American Federation of Labor unions,
and I say this in behalf of myself and my
colleagues and for the millions of workers
back home whom we have the privilege of
representing. I say, George, to you and
your colleagues we extend the hand of fellowship, and I say, together, united in
the solidarity of human brotherhood, we
shall go forward to build a labor movement
and a better America for all people in this
great and wonderful country of ours.
I say to George rrieany: George, this is
a great new beginning. You will lead the
American labor movement to higher and higher
levels of achievement. You will enable the
labor movements to make a greater and greater
contribution to the world of America and the
free world. And I pledge to you, George,
with all of my heart, that those of us who
share in the leadership of the CIO shall
stand with you, and together with your colleagues from the AFL we shall fight together,
we shall march together, and we shall win
together that bet~er tomorrow for the
American people. 11
11

William F. Schnitzler of the Joint Labor Unity
"The Merger Convention", American Federalist,
Vol. 63 No. 1, January, 1956, pp. 5,6,8.
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Committe e , acting as the convention's Credentials commit t ee gave the report as to how many dele gates were
eligible to be seated in the first constitutional convention and recommended that they be seated forthwith.
The report of the Credentials Committee was adopted
unanimously.
Temporary Cha irman Reut her then recognized James
B. Car ey, president of the International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Worker.

Mr. Carey then

r ead the report of the Joint Unity Committee setting
fo rth proposed rules and order of business for the
convention.

They were approved by the delegates.

David McDonald, president of the United Steel Workers
of Amer i ca, in an address to the convention on behalf of
the J oint Unity Committee, expressed his feeling of the
pr ide in being able to make this report dealing with
steps which had culminated in the achievement of the
AFL- CI O merger.
For the Joint AFL-CIO Unity Committee, Mr. McDonald
then s ubmitted the following resolution:
"Be It Resolved, That this initial cons titutional convention of the American Federat ion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations confirms and ratifi e s the action
of the seperate conventions of the American
Federation of Labor a_!1.d Congress of Industrial
Organizations in ratifying, approving and
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adopting the resolution on the achievement
for the merger of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the implemention agreement and the
constitution of the American Federation of
Labor B.lld Congress of Industrial Organizations.11l
This resolution was submitted to the delegates in
a standing vote.

The resolution was then adopted by

the unanimous action of the convention.
Mr. Reuther then yielded the chair to President
Bates of the Bricklayers, who announced that nominations of officers were now in order.

Mr. Reuther was

given the first opportunity in the nomination of the
president of the new organization.

The election of

officers were in the following manner.
George Meany was elected president.

William F.

Schtizler was nominated secretary-treasurer.

There

were twenty-seven vice-presidents elected.
Mr. Meany's acceptance speech was one similar to
that of Mr. Reuther in that it stressed unity and what
the two organizations could do as a unit.

He also ad-

vocated unity and exerted efforts to rid the new organization of past conflicts.

This point is shown in

his acceptance speech when he said:
7

Ibid., p. 8.
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"As we go forward together in this movement, let us stop thinking in terms of prior
labels. Let us make up our minds that from
this moment on there is just one label on
all the organizations and all of the membership of this great organization, and that
this label is AFL-CIO and nothing else.
Let us apply this philosophy in terms of
good faith, determination to live together,
to work together and to tgink together for
one united organization."
All events up to this point were events of the first
day of the convention.

The second, was composed of

mostly speeches by prominent figures.

They included

Nrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Thurgood

arshall, Gover-

nor Harriman of New York, and Marion Folson, Secretary
of the Department of Health, Welfare and Education.
The third, fourth and fifth day consisted of mostly
discussing business of a formal nature.

Finally at

5:20 o'clock the afternoon of Thrusday, December 8, 1955,
the first constitutional convention of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, having completed its momentous work, slipped
into history.
How The AFL-CIO Functions
The AFL-CIO is a federation of national and international unions.

Each national union is fully autono-

8

Ibid., p. 14.
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mous.

Each carries on collective bargaining with

employers; maintains its own headquarters; elect its
own officers; maintains the staff needed for administrat ion and services; sets its own dues; provides the
services its members need and want.
The AFL-CIO holds biennial conventions which establ ish a general policy on economic, legislative and
political matters.

The convention also elects the of-

ficers of the AFL-CIO.

The convention is the supreme

governing body of the organization.
The first president of the AFL-CIO is George l"'ieany,
who was elected unanimously at the merge r convention
whic h established the AFL-CIO.

Elected at the same time

was the organization's first secretary-treasurer,
William F. Schnitzler.
The AFL-CIO has 27 vice presidents.

The president,

the secretary-treasurer and the 27 vice presidents constitute the Executive Council, which is the official
governing body of the organization betwe en conventions.
The AFL-CIO has two other official bodies-the
Executive Committee and the 3eneral Board.

The execu-

tive Committee is composed of the president, the
secretary-treasurer and 6 vice presidents, elected by

-
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the Executive Council.
This group meets more often than the

xecutive

Council and serves as an advisory group to the executive officers .
The General Board 1s composed of the Executive
Council plus one officer of each affiliated union and
one officer of each of the six constitutional departments.
The General Board meets annually to act upon matters
referred to it by the Executive Council .
The AFL-CIO, through its headquarters staff, provides services to the affiliated unions, in the fields
of research, education, legal aid, p ublic relations
and other matters .

It serves as the general representa-

tive of all the affiliated unions in a ppearances before
Congress and in dealing with the various departments
of the government.
Thro u~h its field staff, the AFL-CIO aids affiliates
and organizes workers into unions of their own choosing,
giving recognition to the principle that both the craft
and industrial are appropriate, equal and necessary as
methods of union organization.
The AFL-CIO has established, and is vigorously
enforceing, a six-point program of ethical standards,
designed to rid the labor-movements of racketeers.
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The se Codes of Ethical Practices, ba sed on the unwritte n law of the trade union movement, insist that
union office funds are a p ublic trust to be used only
for the benefit of workers. Unions v iola ting this code
of hono r face actions on the part of the federation.
Unions a re expected to observe these codes, wh ich are
the bas ic policy of the AFL-CIO.
The AFL-CIO has the following constitutionally
es tabli s hed committees:

Legislat ion, Civil Rights,

Pol itical Education, Ethical Prac t ices, International
Affair s, Education, Social Security, Economic Policy,
Communi ty Services, Housing, Research, Public Relations , Safety and Occupational Health, Veteran Affairs.
The AFL-CIO publishes a weekly newspaper, the
AFL- CIO News; a monthly magazine, The AFL-CIO American
Federalist; two monthly economic reports, Labor's
Econom ic Review and Collective Bargaining Report.

Some

of the depa rtments of the AFL-CIO issue specialized
p ublica tions.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTS OF THE MERGER
It 1s obvious that the impact of the merger 1s unlikely to be felt immediately by most Americans.

But

it is equally obvious that the mere ex•istence of an
organization with 15 million members, if it measures
up to the hopes which have accompanied its creation,
will have certain definite long-range effects.

The

confidence with which t he AFL-CIO met, the sense of
over-increasing maturity, and the very serious responsibilities that its size and influence are certain to
have a definite effect upon it.
The illogical fear (of the critics of the merger)
is that the merger will make the unions impregnable,
with the give-and-take of bargaining completely eliminated.

The critics object not only to the merger of

federations, but also to companywide bargaining and
nationwiie unions.

They have often tried to build a

case for application of the anti-trust laws, which were
passed to regula te the empires of corporate monopoly,
to 19bor unions.

But labor 1s not a "giant trust".

It remains, after the merger as before, a voluntary
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associa tion of auto nomous unions.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that nothing
will change.

Obviously there are advantages for unions

in t he merger of their federa t ion, or the new federation
would never have come into existence.
In se eking to appraise the labor movement of the
f ut ure , the problem is to look into va rious predictions
as to wha t the merger will actually bring about and
determine the validity of these predictions.
The "Labor Monopoly" Charge
Bvery since the news of the merger of the American
Federati on of Labor a nd the Congress of Industrial Organizations was first ann ounced it has be en g reeted with almo st universal acclaim and optimism.
Leaders from all segments of our n a tional life have
jo ined l eaders of labor, speaking for 15 million working
men and women, in heralding the newly achieved labor
unity as a hopeful forward step, one which will advance
the we lfare of not only wage and salary earners, but
the ent ire nation.
Ye t before the merger had be en consummated, fearridden voices were being raised a gainst it, alleging
that American trade unions-; which ha d long been re-
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garded as "la bor monopolies", ha ve now achieved a
"Nonopoli stic power" which threatens to destroy the
economi c fabric of the nation.
Of course, those of us who are familiar with the
history of trade unionism and the nature of the collect ive bargaining process are little shaken by these
fre nzied and fearful forewarnings.

We know that for

more than a century our labor unions have not only
helped to r a ise American living standards and the effective operation of the free enterprise system, but
have consi stently defended and advanced all our country's
cherished beliefs and institutions as well.

For us, the

constructive record of the American trade union movement
is answer enough to t he labor monopoly charge.
There are, nonetheless, millions of our fellow
citizens who are not union members or who are not personally familiar with collective bargaining and its
economic justification and who are being fed an unvaried
diet of anti-labor propaganda.

1'o

effectively evaluate

the labor monopoly charge, I believe tha t a brief examination of both structure and collective bargaining
practices of American unions and their impact upon the
economy is in order.
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Those who declaim against the "dangerous monopoly
power of unions" rely on emotion more than logic.

Yet,

by critically shifting their inflamatory charges, it
is possible to identify three variations of the monopoly
charge .
1.

There are those who still argue that the basic

concept of collective bargaining is, in itself, essentually monopolistic and that all unions should therefore
be

outlawed as a menance to competitive free enterprise.
2.

There are those who concede that unions are all

right as long as they bargain locally only and with
but one employer at a time.

However, if a contract is

negotiated with several employers jointly (multi-employer
bargaining) or even on a company wide basis, this some
how become s monopolistic.

J.

There are those who argue that the AFL-CIO will

now wield economic power of such proportion as to make
it a nationwide monopoly.
Let us examine each of these propositions:
1. The Ancient "Conspiracy" Doctrine
every since the Industrial Revolution, the charge
has been advanced that any association of working people
to raise wages and improve working conditions is a re-
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straint of trade and should be outlawed as a conspiracy.
Some people still cling to the notion that the
price of labor like everything else must be set in the
market p l ace through unrestrained competition betwe en
buyers and sellers.

Since it is illegal for businessme n

to combine to fix prices, the same rule must apply to
workers who combine to raise their wages, they insist.
And so the courts once held, up to slightly more than a
century ago.
Gradually, beginning with the famous decision of
Jus tice Shaw of 1assachusetts back in 1842,* the courts
conc luded that the organization of working people into
a union should not be viewed as a conspiracy.
Finally, in 1914, as a result of the efforts of
Samuel Gompers and the unions of that period, this
judicial recognition that unions are not restraints of
trade or monopolies was reinforced by the Congress of
the United States itself.

In the famous Clayton Act,

Congress specially excluded unions from anti-trust proce edings unless they engaged in collusion with employers
in the restraint of trade.
*C ommonwealth vs. John Hunt et al., IV Metcalf

(45 Kassachusetts) (1842).
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Why did the courts, and finally Congress, come to
this conclusion?
Because it had become clear to all fair-minded
people that America could not tolerate the economic
doctrine that the lowest possible wage established by
supply and demand in a so-called "free" labor market
l'las good for workers and good for the country.
If a humane and prosperous economy were to be
achieved , clearly the outmoded concept that the sale
of a worker 's service is no different from the sale of
a load of bricks, that both are mere commodities to be
barte red in the market place under the same economic
rule s, had to be rejected.
The reasons are fairly obvious:
(a)

Generally a corporation can afford to hold off

selling its products if the price is unsatisfactory.
The worker , on the other hand, has no such advantage.
When he turns down the employer's job offer because the
price (that is, the wage) is too low, what he loses while
looking for a better offer is lost forever.

Besides, he

can't hold out long; his family must eat every day.
(b)

Moreover, while the going "market price" of

most products is generall:c..,,,well-known to business buyers
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and sellers, the price of labor (the prevailing wage rate)
is often unknown to the worker looking for a job.

With-

out a union to help him he has little chance of knowing
if an offer is below the "market price".
(c)

In addition, corporations can and do ship their

products to wherever they bring the highest price.

The

worker, on the other hand, cannot easily move with his
family from one city to another even if he has reason
to hope that his service will bring a higher price elsewhere.
(d)

Finally, in our industrial system there are

gradually more and more wage and salary earners who must
seek to sell their services, but few employers available
as buyers.

Except in abnormal circumstances the supply

usually exceeds the demand.

Without collective bargain-

ing, through labor unions, working people would have
little choice but to accept whatever price is offered
for their services.
Because of these tremendous advantages of the employer over the worker in the absence of unions and collective bargaining, isn't it the sheerest nonsense to
talk about the benefits of "pure competition" in a socalled "free" labor markeU
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At every work place the foreman would merely auction
off jobs and the lowest bidder would set the prevailing
"mar ke t price".

The depressed wages which would result

woul d not only injure working people; they would cause
ins ufferable damage to the national economy, as well.
Collective Bargaining Ends The Employers'
Arbitrary Power
It was the injustice of t h is degrading economic
doc trine that moved Congress to declare in the Clayton
Act: "The l a bor of a human being is not a commodity or
art icle of commerce" and further, tha t l a bor organizations and their members s hall not

11

be held or construed

to be illegal combina tions or conspiracies of restraint
of trade under the anti-trust laws".
Twenty-one years later, in 1935 Congress took another
great forward step when it recognized:
"t he inequality of bargaining power betwe en
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actua l liberty of contract, and
employers who a re organized in the corporate or
other f orms of ownership associa tion."
This inequality, Congress added:
"tends to aggravate recurrent business depre ssions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wa ge earners in industry and
by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage r a tes and worki~ conditions within and
be tween industries. 11 1

Da le Yoder, Labor Economics and Labor Problems{New York:
I1c Gr aw- Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), p.- 6Jl.
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This was the orgina l language of the great National
Labor Relations Act and it remains intact in the law
today, even after the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947.
Then , to redress this inequality in the American
economic structure, Congress enacted in 1935, specific
meas ures to encourage and to protect the worker's right
to organize into unions and to enforce the employer's
obligation to bargain collectively with their employees
in good faith.
This was the orginal purpose and the promise of the
Act, until modified and weakened by the Taft Hartley Act.
As long as employers could practically dictate wages and
working conditions, we heard no outcry about "I·onopoly"
over the labor market.

Were not employers then enjoy-

ing a virtual monopoly of their own, much to their
advantage?
It is precisely because "pure 11 competition in that
kind of

11

free" labor market gives the employer an unfair

advantage that workers are led to join unions.

Only

through genuine collective bargaining is it possible to
bring democracy and economic justice into the processes
through which t he price of labor services is determined
in our modern free enterprise system.
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Does
Whi l e most Americans today agree tha t collective
bargaini ng is essential to successful relations between
wor kers and employers in our modern society, some argue
tha t uni on bargaining mu s t be restricted to one locality
and one employer at a time.

Broader forms of bargain-

ing, they ma intain, constitute a "la bor monopoly."
However a quick look at t he bargaining practices
of American unions and t heir economic justification will
expo se the falla cy of t his conclusion.
The re are 15 million men and women who make up t he
AFL-CIO be i ng over 60,000 local unions located in the
countless communities across the nation in which they
live and work.

Members of a local either work together

at a sing le work place or are engaged in a special craft
or trade i n a pa rtic ular locality.
Near ly all local unions are affiliated with a
nat ional union which corresponds as a r ule to the indu str y or trade with wh ich the members are associated.
At the time of t he merger 141 national unions came under
the banner of AFL-CIO.
Ove r t he years the nature of collective bargaining
relations hi ps between local unions and employers ha s
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taken on many forms in response to t he special economic
problems and traditional practices of the various trades
and industries.
Today , well over 100,000 seperate management-labor
agreements are negotiated by AFL-CIO unions and employers
thro ughout the United States.

Most of these are locally

negotiated by local unions with their seperate employers.
When a corporation operates in more than one locality,
however, a single contract is sometimes negotiated which
cove rs all, or most, of the locals organized at the various plents of t he same corporation.

This companywide

bargaining in wh ich the top corporation and national
union officials play a part is the accepted practice of
many of our l a rgest nati on-wide enterprises.
On the other hand, many locals now bargain jointly
with associations of emp loyers which represent several
competing companies within a city, a larger geographic
area, or ocassionally within an entire industry.

These

multi-employer agreements cover about one-third of the
members of the AFL-CIO.
}ulti-employer bargaining is beneficial to both the
unions and employers who practice it.

Those who would

outlaw it either fail to understand
or ignore its fre...
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que nt e conomic ne ces s ity a nd its const r uctive contribution t o the general welfare.
Bec ause the structure and operations of business
enterpris es are constantly changing, unions must expand
t he scope of t heir bargainin~ activity if t hey are to
effe c tive ly and efficiently serve t heir purpose.

On

the one hand t he emergence of huge multiplant corporations that produce and sell over t he e n tire nation has
required the development of companywi de collective bargaining .

On t he other, special problems arising among

competing e mployers, and their impact upon wage earners,
have given rise in many cases to the necessity for multiemp l oyer bargaining.
Mult i -employer bargaining reflects t he inevitable
des ire a nd necessity to secure fair and equalized wage
rates among competitors in the labor market, a necessity tha t neither t he fairminded employer nor his workers
can i gnore .
The cha rge that company-wide bargaining also lead
to a labor monolpoly is likewise unsupported by fact.
Experience ha s demostrated conclusively that substandard
wages i n any of t he operations of a multi- _plant company
under mine fair wa ges and \i[Orking conditions at other
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work place s.

In the a bsence of uniform wa ge rates, pro-

duct ion t end s to flow towards the lower p a yin~ plants
if othe r f actors are equal.
For t his reason unions naturally seek to organize
and obta in a uniform wage structure for all t he employees
of t he l arge multi-pla nt corporations, as well as for
the employees of competing companies.
As a matter of h istoric fact, all of the diverse
type s of co llective bargaining, whether loca l and with
a single ent erprise, multi-employer, or company-wide
have emerged in response to the changing requirements
of our modern industrial society.

On the whole they are

serv ing labor, management and t he entire nation realistically and remarkably well.
It just is not true that the trade unions have secured a monopolistic stranglehold over t he American
economy .

~veryone recognizes t hat monopolies hurt the

nat ion; they encourage (1) the destruction of competition, (2) the r e stric tion of output, and (J) extortiona t e
pr i ces .
We have s e en how collec t ive bargain i ng operates to
des troy the emp loyers' monopoly over the labor market
r a t he r crea t e one.

We have seen tha t far from re-

.5.5
straining trade, it encourages a higher type of competition based on better production methods, improved
products and superior salesmanship instead of on worker
speed-up and subs tandard wages and salaries.
Furthe rmore, collective bargaining does not lead
to restricted output.

On the contrary, the greatest

production ~rowth in the history of the nation and i t s
greatest union growth both have been achieved simultaneo usly .

American labor knows that only greater pro-

duct ion can bring higher living stardards and it knows
too that fairly paid men and women, secure in their jobs,
under union conditions of employment, work productively
as well.
The AFL-CIO A Great Force For Good
Let us finally consider the newest charge that the
AFL-CIO wil l now wield so great a economic power tha t
it will cons titute a vir tual monopoly.

This concl usion

is completly false and wi thout foundation.
First , it must be understood that t he AFL-CIO is
not a collective bargaining agency at all but a federation of autonomous national unions.
demands.
ing table .

I t issues no wage

It has nei ther voice nor vote at any bargainIt can order no s t rikes.

These matters are
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within the scope of the national unions a lone and the
locals a ffili a ted wit h them.

It was so when the AFL

and CI O were seperate federations and so i t ha s remained
after the me r ger.
The AFL-CIO Effects On Political
Act i on And Legislation
During t he actual process of t he merger, public a t tention was drawn strongly toward its implications for
poli tical powere

Some persons t hought t he merger pre~

saged a labor pa rty, with unions running the government.
Ot he rs though it meant t ha t unions would effec t ively
take over t he Democratic pa rty, o t her that it would
mere ly bring s t ronger lobbying, and st i ll others that
there wou l d be no noticeable result at all.
Before one can start to criticize or predict t he
bad effects of the AFL-CIO on politics he must realize
tha t, the re app eared to be a consensus among invited
spe akers and in federation actions that the labor movement had a clear res ponsibility to f ulfill through
independent political action, but that the votes of union
members should not and could not be cont rolled.
The new constitution stated the principle in these
terms :
"Wh ile prBserving t he independence
of t he labor movement from political control,
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to encourage workers to register and vote,
to exercise their f ull rights and res ponsibilities of citizens h ip, and to perform
their rightful part in the political life
of the loc21, state, and national communitie s."
President Meany, in his opening address, said:
"In my book l abor not only h a s a right to
raise its voice in regard to the policies under
which our Federal J overnment is administered,
but we have a duty as citizens to take part in
shaping the policies of our Government ••••••••
No one can t ell the American voter how he has
got to vote •••••• our political philosophy is
to inform our people on the issues that they
have before t hem, and in particular the issues
that affect the welfare of our own people."-'
Full participation in the processes of American
government was enco uraged by the convent i on's principal
speakers .

Pre sident Ei s enhower told the delegates:

"You are more than union members bound together by a common goal of better wages, better
working conditions and protection of your security . You are American citizens.
The roads you travel, the sc hools your
children attend, the taxes you pay, the standards of integrity in government, the conduct
of the public business is your business as
Americans. And while a ll of you, as to the
public business, have a common goal----a
stronger and better America----your views as
to the best means of reaching that goal vary
2

Article II, Constitution of the AFL-CIO, Published
by the AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., January, 1956, p. 5.
3

"George Meany's Acceptance Speech," American Federalist, Vol . 63, No. 1, -January, 1956, p. 16.
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as do i~ any other group of American Citizens."
Secretary of Labor Bitchell said: "I believe that
labor's voice in public affairs should be heard loud
and clear.

I believe that as American citizens you have

a duty and responsibility to make your voice heard."

5

These are but a few of the facts to demonstrate that
there was encouragement for union intervention in politics.

It was encouraged and will probably be beneficial

in the future.
Concerning the merger's potential political effects,
as with the economic or collective bargaining side, the
really meaningful question is, will t he degree of political monopoly be greater under the new federation than
it was when the labor movement was s plit?
I think the answer is yes, but not to a major degree.
In favor of a higher degree is the likelihood of much
more agreement on wha t candidates for government office
are to be supported.

But this will not occur on a 100%

4

"What President ~isenhower s aid in his Telephone
Speech," Ame rican Federalist, Vol. 63, No. 1, Janua ry,
1956, p. 46 .
5
J . P. Goldberg, "A Survey of American Labor During
1955, 11 r onthly Labor Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, February,
1

1956, p . 153.
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basis.

An example of this type of action was demon-

strated at the first meeting of the executive council
in February, 1956.

Council members Dave Beck and

Maurice Hutcheson, presidents, respectively, of the
Teamsters and Carpenters, boycotted the main session on
politic s .

Both men had supported the Republican party

in t he past .

"Beck announced that his union would for6
mulate its own political policies."
Also, organized
labor will be considerably more potent in the lobbying
end of politics.

There will be more agreement on what

to lo bby for, more effective presentation of labor's
views to legislative and administrative agencies.
Against a much higher degree of political power are
the makeup of the two ma jor political parties, the makeup
of the electorate (including union members), and the free,
secre t ballot system of the country.

Each of the two

parties can and does appeal to members of all classes
and groups of voters.

I suppose that a fairly sub-

stantial majority of unions members does just naturally
vote Democratic, just as a substantia l majority of
busines smen vote Republican, but some businessmen and
many labor members lean the other way or at least indeAlfred Kuhn, Labor, (New York: Rinhart and Co.,
Inc., 1956), p. 74.
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pendent.
Another political element in America is the laziness
of voters.

Unless things are really critical and issues

sharply drawn, many voters have to be pushed to the polls.
But when a man does get into a voting booth and pulls
the curt ain shut, he is alone.

In that privacy, no one

is going t o tell him how to vote.
Out of these facts come four points:
(1 )

COPE (the AFL-CIO Committee on Political .&iuca-

tion) wi ll have little chance of changing the votes of
those l 8bor leaders and union members who are set in
t he i r polit i cal ha its.
(2)

COP= ma

be able to get more out of the vote

than its nredecessors could.
(J)

COPE may be able to influence those who are

truly independent.

(4)

COPE will be helpless in the face of secret

voting.
Certainly the federation cannot at present deliver
a bloc of 15 million votes, or any substantial number,
and will probably remain unable to do so for the foreseeable future.

Labor's voice in lobbying and its stand

on legislation will probably become clearer, throu ~h
the divergences of inter~st among different unions will
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still prevent it from being unanimous.
Implications For Nanagement
In closing, I should like to try to bring the collective bargaining and the political portions of this
discussion together .

Let's ask the question, Why does

labor engage in political action?

Because labor thinks

it can get from government certain things that employers
are either unable or unwilling to give in collective
bargaining?

Nore fundamentally, because labor suspects

that employers are basically unfriendly and that it is
therefore necessary to have a friendly government?
If these questions are answered affirmatively, it
would seem to follow that if better relations are between unions and management at the bargaining table
and in the settlement of grievances, the less will
labor turn to political action .
What are the essential requirements of good unionmanagement relations?

Does the employer have to give

his union everything it asks for in order to prevent
it from running the government or causing a great degree
of harm to the employer?

Not at all.

It must be understood that even when union members
find that demands are rejected, they are ah1ays aware
that all strikes are hazardous .

Unionist know too well
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the hardship a strike may bring and more, they know
that strikes are often lost.

Besides, the staying

power of unions is rela tively limited because neither
the members nor their organizations have the g reat
resources of industry.
To demons trate this, it was found that the Westinghouse Electric Company is reported to have had about

~350 million on hand in cash and in United States bonds
alone when the strike of 55,000 of its employees began.
The int ernational Union of

lectrical Workers, was found

to have had less than ,/500, 000 in its national treasury.
The million member United Steelworkers of America, for
example, has total assets only J20 million in its national
treasury compared to the ,if3 billion in assets of U.S.
Steel alone .
"The total assets of all American Unions
have been found to add up to hardly ~60 per
member, or less than a weeks earnings. The
assets of American corporations, on the
other hand, now exceed $185 billion. 11 '1
For all these reasons the bargaining power of even
the strongest unions is subject to great restraints and
limitations.

To facilitate a better relationship be-

tween unions and management, there are certain things

7
"Collective Bargaining-A Bulwork of Free Interprise,11 Labors Economic .Review, Vol. 1, No. 2. February,
1956, p. 19.
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tha t must be done.

They are:

( l} The responsible executives (includ ing top
management } must convince t he union leaders h i p and
membe r ship that t he company is not out to undermine
or weaken the union.
( 2) If management wis hes employees and unions to be
sympathetic and constructively responsive to its needs
and problems, it must demonstrate tha t it has the same
a t ti tude toward the needs and problems of the unions as
an e ntity and the members as human beings.

(3) If these attitudes are es t ablished, management,
when it has to, can say no and be believed and respected.
It 1s a fact that more and more corporate executives
and s upervi sors are coming to adopt and act on these attitudes that leads me to conclude that t he merger of the
AFL and the CIO presents no serious threat to management
or to the American way of life.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY

Not everyone thinks that it is a good thing to have
labor united into one big organization.

They contend

that there are some potential dangers in a united labor
movement .

Some fear that big labor will one day form

its own party in an attempt to capture the government.
Others fear a union "monopoly" of the work force while
others say that it has bad implications for management.
Here is an analysis of the economic factors that
have made collective bargaining essential to the welfare
of bot h the worker and the nation and account for the
growth of

11

multi-employer 11 and "company-wide" bargain-

ing in response to the changing scope and the competitive practices of business.
The reason why neither unionism, the emergence
of diverse collective bargaining forms, nor, indeed,
the AFL-CIO merger itself can be deemed dangerous or
monopolistic are developed in this thesis.
To fac ilitate an understanding of the contents of
this paper , a brief history of early unionism and the
formation of our present union structure was discussed.
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The union movement was explored from the formation of
the journeymen cordwainers (shoemakers) in Philadelphia
in 1792 through the Knights of Labor, to the A. F. of L.
in 1886.

Then came the s plit in the AFL and the CIO

was formed in 1935.

Finally, in 1955, an event occured

which was the motivating force of this thesis; the merger
of the AFL and CIO into one g iant federation.

The merger

precipitated a great controversy over the economic effect s of the merger upon our economy. The major predictions of what effects the merger would have on our
economy are presented below:
Monopoly charge:

The AFL-CIO will cause a union

monopoly of the work force.
Despite labor's 20-year growth from J.5 million to
17 million unions have not been able to organize more
than one third of the U.S. wage and salary workers.

Their

number grows as the work force grows, but the union percentage of the total has even slipped a bit, indicating
that a plateau has been reached.

A major reason for

this is that the remaining unorganized two thirds of the
work force is either in small plants, which are difficult to organize, or else belong to the white-collar
cata~ory which does not identify itself with labor.
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Some unions will undoubtely expand but others will
probably decl ine.

The precentage of t he entire work

force which belong to unions alone se em to indicate
the prospect of any union monopoly on the work force
seen slight.
Political cha rge:
party.

The AFL-CIO will cause a union

The AFL-CIO will have a definite effect on poli-

tical issues.
All pas t experiences indicate that no one can control the labor vote.

In the future as in the past labor

is likely to exert tremendous influence through the
Democratic party through lobbying , but it does not yet,
nor is it likely to control that party.

No practical

politicia n believes that labor will, or can, start its
own pa rty.

Americans do not like to regard themselves

as frozen t o any particular class or party.
Management Implications:

The AFL-CIO will have a

bad effect on management in the collective bargaining
proces s .

Their power will be greater and they can de-

mand more.
Before we can say that there will be more power in
the collective bargaining process, we must remember that
the AFL-CIO does not engage in collective bargaining.
This function still resides within the national union.
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It is also a fact that most managements have more money
than most unions and can take a strike longer.

Unions

know that strikes are not always won and they can be
harmful as well as profitable.

Finally, unions and

managers are coming to better agreements in the collective bargaining process.

No immediate dangers seem to

lie in this particular area.
In summary, we see no solid reasons to be afraid
of U.S. lebor.

It seems likely that, whatever political

adventures labor may undertake in coming years, its
greatest gain will continue to be made in the economic
area where its continued cooperation with management
keeps productivity rising.
The principal lesson that both labor and management
need to learn is that while each goes on using out-worn
emotional ch8rges, the real character of their difference
has changed a ltogether, just as the shape of the whole
economy has changed in the last twenty years .

The fact

is t hat labor and management are far closer together
than either seem to realize.

It is symptomatic that the

new organization's charter strikes out all references
to the class struggle that were in the old AFL preamble.
This agreement was formulated to o btain the major objectives of the organizationbetter by getting the full
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cooperation of all the members.

Labor and manage-

ment should formulate similar agreements.

It is a

healthy thing for management and labor to continue to
be watchdogs, one of the other.
greater obligation:

However, both have a

to keep productivity and real

wages rising and business profitable and expanding.
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